Over the past generation, the rise of East Asia and especially China, has brought about a sea change in the economic and political world order. At the same time, global warming, environmental degradation, food and water shortages, population explosion, and income inequities have created a perfect storm that threatens the very survival of humanity. It is clear now that the Westphalian model of individual sovereign states seeking their own self-interest will not be able to respond effectively to this win-win or (...) lose-lose crisis. In this volume, a cadre of distinguished scholars comes together to reflect on Confucianism and Deweyan pragmatism as possible resources for a new geopolitics that begins from an ontology of interdependence and recognizes the irreducibly ecological nature of the human experience at every level. Both Confucian and Deweyan traditions emphasize the primacy of experience, the importance of vital relationality, and the moral roots of good governance. The potential benefits of conceptually blending the two are many. Indeed, the contemporary Chinese philosopher Tang Junyi provides us with a cosmological understanding of the "idea" of Confucianism that, in parallel to Dewey's "idea" of democracy, can enable us to anticipate the core values, if not the specific contours, of a "Confucian democracy." Just as Dewey's "idea" of democracy is his vision of the flourishing communal life made possible by the contributions of the uniquely distinguished persons that constitute it, Tang Junyi's Confucianism is a pragmatic naturalism directed at achieving the most highly integrated cultural, moral, and spiritual growth for the individual-in-community. In both, we find an affirmation of communal harmony as a process "starting here and going there" through which those involved learn together to do ordinary things in extraordinary ways. Just such a cosmological understanding of democracy is one way of describing what will be needed to address the many predicaments characterizing the environmental, cultural, socioeconomic, and political dynamics of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

According to the thesis of Strong Predictionism, we typically have stronger evidence for a theory if it was used to predict certain data, than if it was deliberately constructed to accommodate those same data, even if we fully grasp the theory and all the evidence on which it was based. This thesis faces powerful objections and the existing arguments in support of it are seriously flawed. I offer a new defence of Strong Predictionism which overcomes the objections and provides a (...) deeper understanding of the epistemic importance of prediction. I conclude by applying this account to strategies for defending scientific realism. (shrink)

To solve the problem of induction we had first better know what it is. Some ways of formulating the worry about induction are underwhelming as they depend on assumptions that don’t survive much scrutiny. Perhaps the most disturbing argument for inductive skepticism appeals to the claim that we could not possibly be justified in taking our inductive methods to be reliable independently of our use of those methods. And the use of inductive methods cannot give us justification to suppose that (...) they are reliable. I argue for a new way to escape the first horn of this dilemma. (shrink)

THE OBJECTIVITY OF REALITY Reality and Mind We cannot talk or think about reality without talking or thinking about it. This is a truism which seems almost ...

This article argues that juristic theories must be understood in relation to the historical conditions in which they have emerged. This is not to reduce theories to their context but to gain essential insight into their aims, meaning, and scope with the aid of such “external” reference points. Here I use the ideas of the Swedish legal realist Vilhelm Lundstedt to illustrate these claims, choosing his juristic theory for this purpose specifically because it has been so widely seen as deeply (...) puzzling and “extreme.” The article argues that his central ideas are readily intelligible in historical context. But such a contextual examination of juristic ideas also makes it possible to assess what in them can properly travel beyond immediate context: in other words, what insights about the nature of the jurist's task can legitimately be taken from them for more universal application. Lundstedt's work, despite having been largely ignored or excluded from international juristic debate, has something to offer here if seen through a contextualising lens that sets the possibilities for its broader application in sharp relief. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A discussion of some issues from Grant Gillett's book Reasonable Care. At the metaethical level, Gillett's views about the origin, scope and bindingness of morality are outlined and criticised. Against him it is argued that moral capacity does not follow from linguistic ability, things can matter to non‐concept‐users and universalisability arguments fail to show that immorality is irrational. At the first order level, Gillett's arguments against surrogacy and euthanasia are answered.

Israel Kirzner is to be credited for clarifying and developing the theory of capital and interest set out by Ludwig von Mises and for articulating and defending the pure time preference theory of interest. A revisiting of Mises and his critics suggests that the pure time preference theory is best formulated in terms of economic actions and then applied to the anticipated consequences of those actions. Differences between the Misesian and Knightian reckonings of time preference are to be understood in (...) terms of the contrasting conceptions of a zero time preference. Parallels between the time preference theory of interest and a leisure preference theory of wages are explored. Austrian economics is deemed healthy despite lingering puzzles about its theories of interest and wages.On doit au Professeur Kirzner la clarification et le développement de la théorie du capital et de l’intérêt dans la lignée de Ludwig von Mises et l’articulation et la défense de la théorie de l’intérêt comme étant la préférence pure pour le temps. Une relecture des travaux de Mises et de ses critiques suggère qu la théorie de la préférence pure pour le temps est mieux formulée en termes d’actions économiques et ensuite appliquée aux conséquences anticipées de ces mêmes actions. Les différences entre les acceptions Misessiennes et Knigtienne de la préférence pour le temps doivent être comprises en termes de conceptions différentes d’une préférence nulle pour le temps. Les rapprochements entre la théorie de l’intérêt comme préférence pour le temps et la théorie des salaires comme préférence pour les loisirs sont explorés. L’économie autrichienne est jugée saine en dépit des énigmes persistantes qui entourent ses théories de l’intérêt et des salaires. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Liberation and SpiritualityRoger HaightThese reflections on liberation and spirituality respond to a precise question. There is no better way to begin than in stating it clearly. People committed to action in behalf of liberation need a spirituality. What spirituality does Christianity offer them? The issue is not why Christian spirituality needs to be attentive to the demands of the poor and other victims of discrimination. The reasons why Christian (...) spirituality must be liberationist have been made convincingly over the past forty-five years. It should be taken for granted that Christians are to be concerned with liberation. A slightly different issue is at stake in the question of what spirituality, present in Christianity, is summoned forth when people who are dedicated to the project of liberation turn to Christianity and ask about its spiritual resources. This question comes from a different audience, one made up of those who are not sure that Christianity or religion generally has anything to offer to the commitment to human liberation. In addressing that question the goal is to respond with some clear convictions about what Christianity has to offer and how it may affect the lives of liberationists.Because this has to be done in a short space, the response will appear more like an outline than an argument. But both those familiar with Christianity and those less so will be able to understand the basic elements of the spirituality that is proffered. The presentation moves forward in three parts. The first explores the language of liberation and spirituality. The second and substantive part brings forward four classic witnesses to Christian spirituality and allows each to highlight a particular element of an integral Christian spirituality. And the third emphasizes the dimensions of ultimacy and finality.liberation and spiritualityThe words “liberation” and “spirituality” are familiar to everyone, but they do not bear the same meaning in everyone’s usage. The discussion, then, has to begin with a brief definition of the meaning of these terms as they are used here. These definitions [End Page 135] do not have to be developed at length. What follows simply stipulates aspects of these terms that are crucial for the logic of the position presented here.The term “liberation” is used very broadly because human repression takes many forms. In these reflections “liberation” refers to the process of attaining or assisting others to attain freedom from various obstacles to human flourishing. There can be no doubt that since the nineteenth century social oppression has provided a focal point for understanding liberation. Humanity in the West has gradually become more and more conscious of social and historical conditioning of individual human beings. We have learned that societies are human constructions; that they favor some and neglect, marginalize, and positively subjugate others; that no society has to be the way it is; that it can be changed; that some people encourage and others resist change; and that human beings can have a less or more conscious role in the process. We have the potential to be agents of social liberation. But other forms of liberation need not be excluded from the concept. It does not make any sense to neglect some forms of repressed human freedom in favor of others, even though some forms of human deprivation are more serious than others.One problem with such an open view of liberation is that it seems to give every liberationist concern an equal voice. It may even open a door to competitive interests. It is one thing to say that every human diminishment requires attention, but in a limited economy of human energy, time, and resources we cannot, either as individuals or societies, attend to all problems with equal vigor at the same time. We need some criteria for measuring importance. To this question a scale of values offered by Bernard Lonergan has some relevance. He begins to rank from below in an ascending scale the needs and values that lie open to human commitment.1 The denial of any basic human requirement like food and shelter calls out for liberation. But a scale of values measures relative importance of various human needs and opportunities for freedom’s development... (shrink)

Before they can commit their states to war, leaders who believe that war is necessary must first secure public commitment to collective action and sacrifice. The chief instrument for achieving this...

Beyond Language and Reason: Mysticism in Indian Buddhism Ilkka Pyysiäinen, 1993 Annales Academiæ Scientiarum Fennicæ Dissertationes Humanarum Litterarum 66 Helsiniki, Sumolainen Tiedeakatemia.

The present essay looks to add to the body of literature that seeks to clarify the nature of vengeance and evaluate it morally. However, unlike previous philosophical investigations of vengeance, my essay examines it not from the standpoint of impersonal justice but from the perspective of the one who seeks it, to determine whether it is good for the would-be avenger. The values I measure it by are fulfillment and self-knowledge. The paper has two major parts. In the first, I (...) argue that vengefulness is motivated by two ends: allaying a sense of vulnerability and preserving a positive self-conception. The emotional benefits of a vengeful disposition, I claim, come at the expense of self-knowledge. They are therefore unstable and prone to give way when vengefulness is translated into action. In the second part, I try to substantiate this claim by examining two criticisms of vengeance: that its pursuit can diminish the avenger by consuming him and that it is self-defeating. Framing vengefulness within broader psychoanalytic accounts of the repetition compulsion and projection, I endorse versions of both criticisms that tie vengeance’s failure to provide fulfillment to some of the ways in which it occludes self-knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Experiential Avoidance and Superstition: Considering Concepts in ContextRoger Vilardaga (bio) and Steven C. Hayes (bio)Keywordsacceptance, contextualism, influence, therapyThe target article (García-Montes et al. 2008) explores the application of the concept of superstition, examined from a Sartrian perspective, to psychopathology such as obsessive–compulsive disorder and psychosis. They compare their analysis to two different technical terms taken from current research programs in psychology, which are the notions of Thought–Action Fusion and (...) Experiential Avoidance (EA). We have been asked to respond because our work in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 1999) and Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche 2001) are part of the foundational work in EA, and thus in this short commentary we comment on the article from the point of view of our research program.The article notes several areas of overlap between the ACT/RFT work on EA and their Sartrian perspective on superstition, such as the holistic and contextualistic nature of the analysis, but also several differences which the authors feel advantage their own view.It is difficult to compare the two lines of work without appreciating their context and purpose. Sartre was not a scientific psychologist; ACT/RFT are part of a specific effort at scientific system building, which we term here “contextual behavioral science” (AKA, post-Skinnerian behavior analysis).Contextual behavioral science is a social enterprise that has as its purpose the development of increasingly organized statements of relations among events that allow actions embedded in their historical and situational context to be predicted and influenced with precision, scope, and depth. “Precision” means that a limited set of analytic constructs apply to any one event; “scope” means that a limited set of constructs are needed to analyze a broad range of events; and “depth” means that constructs should cohere across different levels of analysis.Although a real world (or at least the one world) is assumed, the partitioning of the world is thought to be the result of our continuous interactions in and with it. These partitions are not ontological constructions from the perspective of contextual behavioral science because they, too, are actions that are purposive and embedded in their historical and situational contexts. The [End Page 269] deliberate attempt to analyze the world scientifically does not contradict the holistic standpoint of contextualism. When analytic goals are accomplished, constructs are “true,” but multiple truths are possible given multiple goals and historical and situational contexts. Conversely, all forms of contextualism become dogmatic and self-contradictory if their goals are not stated. It is common for contextualists of all varieties to state and defend the ultimate apprehension of reality as a whole, for example, without realizing that any statement about the world including such a defense is a form of breaking down this whole into parts. As we will try to show, the target article seems to fall into this usual contextualistic trap by arguing for what is better, without stating clearly “better for what, assessed how” and without viewing concepts with relevance to their purpose.Prediction and influence with precision, scope, and depth is a purpose, stated naked and in the wind. It is not defended, justified, or given ontological status. To generate powerful ways of speaking as measured against that purpose, contextual behavioral science has embraced a wide variety of methodologies, including laboratory research designed to refine behavioral principles with high levels of precision and scope, and applied research such as randomized controlled trials, analog research, and measure development that test the scope of the principles and theories that result (e.g., Hayes et al. 2006). Whether concepts like EA are helpful is a matter to be considered relevant to the goals of the analysis.As example of the kind of problems the authors create for themselves, consider the following quote from the target article:Although the post-Skinnerians who proposed the EA concept call themselves “contextualists,” they pay no more than lip service to the role of the “social/verbal community” and the cultural context. Their research focuses almost exclusively on laboratory experiments, and does not consider the important role of particular social practices and contexts, such as modernity.(García... (shrink)

Grâce aux œuvres, qui amplifient notre expérience du monde, des êtres et des choses qui le peuplent, nous découvrons que notre attention n'est pas uniforme dans ses accueils et ses inflexions, mais qu'elle se constelle autour de foyers. Certains de ces foyers sont établis, partagés. D'autres sont singuliers, labiles, résultats d'une élaboration subjective qui opère par rapprochements et découpages au sein des catégories artistiques, esthétiques, historiques. Le présent essai porte sur l'un de ces foyers, que le néologisme « intranquillité » (...) est venu nommer, autour duquel se groupent les écrits du poète portugais Fernando Pessoa et de ses « hétéronymes », une série de dessins réalisés par Tatiana Trouvé, la pensée poéthique selon Jean-Claude Pinson et le Monsieur Hulot de Jacques Tati. Il s'attache à restituer l'enquête menée auprès de ce foyer, afin d'éclairer les raisons de sa formation, et d'en dégager un sens susceptible, à son tour, d'être partagé. (shrink)

The aporias of time that Paul Ricœur identifies in the conclusion to his three-volume Time and Narrative offer a fecund starting-point from which to consider how the poetics of narrativity figures in a philosophy of the will. By setting the poetics of narrativity against the aporetics of temporality, Ricoeur highlights the narrative art’s operative power in drawing together incidents and events in answer to time’s dispersion across the present, the past, and the future. In turn, the confession of the limits (...) of narrative opens the way to a broader consideration of the idea of the unity of history in the absence of a meta-historical plot. This idea calls for a reflection on the ethical and political imperative of making freedom a reality for all. By taking the theory of freedom’s actualization as a touchstone, I argue that the vision of a reconciled humanity that for Ricœur is the intended object of the poetics of the will acquires the force of a directive idea. The capacity to refashion the real from within thus proves to be decisive for drawing out the connection between the aporetics of temporality, the poetics of narrativity, and Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

Based on original research, this book marks an important advance in our understanding not only of the fiscal resources available to the English crown but also of the broader political culture of early Tudor England. An original study of taxation under the early Tudors. Explains the significance of the parliamentary lay taxation levied on individuals at this time. Demonstrates the value of the mass of personal tax assessments from this period to social, economic and local historians. Considers the critical position (...) that parliamentary taxation occupies in constitutional history. Sheds light on the political conditions and attitudes prevalent in England under the early Tudors. (shrink)